The recent LIBOR scandals have demonstrated that the panel banks did not report in good faith, leading some to question whether LIBOR was ever accurate. This article derives the equilibrium LIBOR reporting strategy and quantifies the LIBOR bias. It finds that the current trimming mechanism cannot prevent LIBOR rigging, although the LIBOR gets less biased when the cross-sectional dispersion of the panel banks' borrowing costs becomes lower. This explains why LIBOR earned wide adoption before the financial crisis. Additionally, signaling caps LIBOR. However, hiding individual banks' reports to the market blocks signaling altogether. Finally, there exists a mechanism that induces truthful reporting.
Introduction
The London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) is supposed to measure the average interest rate at which major banks can borrow short-term unsecured funds. Currently, it is produced on a daily basis for ten currencies, each with fifteen maturities ranging from overnight to twelve months. Since it is unlikely that all panel banks borrow from the interbank lending market each day in each currency and maturity, LIBOR is not calculated based on actual interbank lending transactions. Instead, LIBOR fixing, the procedure that determines LIBOR, relies on the panel banks' honest estimate of their daily perceived borrowing costs from the interbank lending market. Banker's Association (BBA) introduced LIBOR on January 1st, 1986, LIBOR has became a pivotal benchmark for not only interbank loans, but also financial contracts of less creditworthy borrowers, such as corporations and home buyers. Exchange Commission (SEC), imposes a fine on the LIBOR-rigging banks once their strategic behavior is discovered. The model yields a closed-form result for the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which shows that the current trimming mechanism cannot block the impact of LIBOR manipulation attempts, contrary to Gyntelberg and Wooldridge (2008) . Signaling efforts from panel banks inherently limit LIBOR in capturing high interbank borrowing cost. The equilibrium also suggests that panel banks lose their incentive to signal if their submissions are revealed not to public, but only to the regulator. Increasing regulatory monitoring or putting more member banks in the LIBOR panel also helps to reduce the magnitude of LIBOR bias.
The LIBOR scandal called into question the veracity of the past LIBOR rates, and raised an important question: Given these limitations, how could LIBOR managed to earn ubiquitous adoption and solid reputation in the last two decades? 4 It is therefore important to study the magnitude of LIBOR bias under various historical economic conditions. Although it seems straightforward that banks will manipulate LIBOR as long as their bottom line is sensitive to the rate, my equilibrium reveals that banks' submissions, which are driven by their incentive to profit from manipulating LIBOR, are moderated by the dispersion of borrowing costs across panel banks. When the banks have little incentive to signal their credit quality, the equilibrium reporting strategy only leads to distorted LIBOR when both factors exist. If the borrowing costs among banks are identical, the current LIBOR fixing mechanism induces truthful revelation even if panel banks' incentive to manipulate LIBOR is large. This finding helps to explain why LIBOR has served the global financial market for more than two decades. It also provides helpful information for some recent disputes over historical LIBOR rates.
5
A number of empirical researchers have looked into the LIBOR fixing. Hartheiser and Spieser (2010) look at panel banks' submissions, and estimate the clustering of LIBOR submissions. Snider and Youle (2010) study the relationship between LIBOR submissions and banks' CDS spreads, in various currencies. Abrantes-Metz et al. (2011) compare individual bank quotes to CDS spreads and market capitalization data from early 2007 to mid-2008, and find the data are inconsistent with a material manipulation of the US dollar 1-month LIBOR rate, though anomalies in individual quotes do exist. Kuo et al. (2012) show that during the financial crisis banks were willing to borrow from the Fed at a higher interest rate on the collateral than what they reported in their LIBOR fixing process. My research contributes to the existing literature by providing a theoretical model which describes the equilibrium LIBOR reporting strategy.
Comparative statics results suggest further empirical tests that could be implemented to check how the LIBOR bias varies with different economic factors.
The LIBOR scandal has provoked calls for reforms to build a better benchmark. In this paper, the equilibrium result suggests the existence of a LIBOR fixing mechanism that induces the strategically behaving banks to report honestly. Specifically, I propose a direct, ex ante individually rational and ex ante budget-balanced d 'Aspremont, Gerard and Varet (AGV) mechanism for LIBOR fixing. Finally, the analysis in this paper goes beyond the LIBOR fixing process. For many financial contracts without a liquid market, prices are usually determined by a trimmed average of players' surveyed results. For instance, the daily closing prices of many derivatives traded in the over-the-counter market are formed in a similar manner.
The Baltic Dry Index is another example. The equilibrium result in this paper can also be applied to those markets.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model that describes banks' optimal response. Section 3 discusses the policy and economic implications of banks' equilibrium strategy. Section 4 proposes a direct, ex ante individually rational and ex ante budget-balanced LIBOR fixing mechanism. Concluding remarks appear in Section 6. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix. Each individual bank's borrowing cost has an absolutely continuous cumulative density function F (·), and a unimodal and positive probability density function f (·) over the support Θ. The distribution is common knowledge across banks. The probability density function of the distribution of the nth order statistics out of N − 1 borrowing costs is f (N −1) n (·), and the probability density function of N − nth order statistics is
whereF (s) is the joint cumulative density function of s. In addition, s (N ) j refers to the jth order statistic of s 1 , s 2 , ..., s N .
Since s is not easily observable, the current LIBOR fixing mechanism requires banks to report their borrowing costs. Given banks' submissions
which are also spreads over the risk-free rate, LIBOR is the trimmed average:
is the jth order statistic among b. From bank i's perspective, given its report b i and all other banks' reports b −i = {b j } j =i , the LIBOR rate is
where
continuous, and is increasing in b i given any b −i .
Given the evident breadth of the LIBOR scandal, I assume that all the LIBOR panel banks are strategic. Knowing its own borrowing cost but not other banks' borrowing costs and submissions, bank i submits b i , such that it maximizes the expected payoff conditional on its information set I i = {s i , b i }.
Payoff function of LIBOR panel banks
A bank may benefit from both an income channel and a signaling channel by submitting a strategically chosen b i . In this section, I model only the income channel, and defer the analysis of the signaling channel to the next section.
As Diamond and Dybvig (1983) suggests, a regular commercial bank has maturity mismatch on its balance sheets due to its maturity transformation function. The effective duration of a bank's assets, which usually contains longer-term illiquid assets, is higher than the effective duration of its liabilities, and common sources of a bank's short-term funding are usually related to LIBOR. Therefore, a low LIBOR rate reduces the bank's funding costs. Table 1 shows the sensitivity of Bank of America's projected annual non-trading net interest income to the short end of the yield curve.
A lower short-term rate has a significant impact on net income and helps the financial performance of banks in general. A bank may also benefit from manipulating LIBOR upwards using derivative positions. However, this can only happen on certain trading days, such as the maturity date of the derivative contract. In addition, there is no clear direction of LIBOR manipulation in derivative trading. Therefore, I focus on the balance sheet effect of LIBOR, and subsequently assume that banks benefit from a low LIBOR.
Since a bank's assets and liabilities contain many contracts and positions that relate to the LIBOR, it is reasonable to assume that the bank's income is a continuous function of LIBOR. I approximate the effect of LIBOR locally using a linear function of the LIBOR rate. Let A i refer to the size of bank i's assets, and δ measure the proportion of the bank's assets that are financed through rolling over short-term LIBOR-linked funding channels. I write the income effect of LIBOR submission as
Clearly, δ is a measurement of the maturity mismatch of bank's balance sheet: A bank with higher maturity mismatch is going to gain more from rigging LIBOR downwards.
I assume that the all the banks share the same δ.
Regulators have a non-trivial monitoring task to oversee the LIBOR fixing process.
Like many other monitoring tasks, investigating whether a panel bank has misreported is costly, because it involves auditing the bank's balance sheet. It is not feasible for regulators to inspect every panel bank in each period. As a result, regulators may select some banks to audit according to certain audit triggers. 6 I assume a regulator audits bank i with a small probability α · |ŝ i − b i |, whereŝ i = s i + ε i is the regulator's noisy estimation of the bank's borrowing cost s i . The noise ε i is independent to s i and b i , and E [ε i ] = 0. The constant coefficient α > 0 is common knowledge and is
The BBA's LIBOR fixing protocol demands that panel banks disclose their true borrowing costs or face regulatory penalty. This motivates the setup that, once the regulator audits a panel bank and finds that b i does not equal the actual cost s i , it will impose a penalty ψA i · |s i − b i | on the bank. I assume the constant coefficient ψ > 0 is common knowledge among banks. As the cases of UBS 7 and Barclays 8 suggest, ψ is usually many times higher than the income a bank can earn from a one-period LIBOR manipulation.
Thus, the payoff of bank i given the borrowing cost s and the bank's bid b is
Since scaling the payoff by A i does not affect the equilibrium outcome, and ε i is independent of s i and b i , I focus on the bank's scaled payoff function
where L 0 is defined in equation 1. The parameters δ, α, and ψ are the same across panel banks. In addition, since scaling the payoff Π by δ does not change the preference ordering, I can focus on the penalty ratio αψ/δ instead. Since the penalty coefficient αψ is not observed, αψ/δ can be treated as the implied penalty coefficient, which banks use to estimate the penalty while submitting LIBOR quotes. Π i (s, b) is random for 
Equilibrium Analysis
Corollary 1. Since the probability density function f (s i ) is positive over the domain Θ, bank i maximizes its expected payoff conditional on s i for each s i :
Definition. The value function for bank i is
After the definition of the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, the next section discusses the property of the equilibrium submission strategies.
Equilibrium
Notice that the payoff function Π i (s i , s −i , b i , b −i ) satisfies the strictly increasing difference condition in (s i , b i ) for all i, i.e., given s i < s 
In other words, a bank's marginal payoff from submitting a lower LIBOR bid goes down when its borrowing cost becomes lower. This guarantees the existence and monotonicity of the symmetric pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium, as proved by Lemma 2. 
The monotonicity of the best response function is intuitive to see: bank i's best response β * i only depends on its own s i , and other bank's report b −i . Therefore, even if all the other banks have non-monotone reporting strategies, bank i should still stick to a monotone reporting strategy.
Based on the value of parameters, the equilibrium strategy β (s i ) could be strictly increasing over the support Θ or constant over some region θ ⊆ Θ. The next two propositions describe both equilibrium strategies. Proposition 3 gives the condition for having a strictly increasing equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If the probability density function of the nth order statistics f
and N −nth order statistics f
N −n (·) satisfies the condition for strictly increasing
then the equilibrium strategy β * : Θ → Θ for each bank i is strictly increasing and
Figure 1 plots a strictly increasing equilibrium. There are a few things to note.
First, ∆ (s i ) is the probability that bank i's equilibrium submission gets into the LI-BOR calculation, where
is the "first-best" report of the bank if there exists a central planner who determines banks' submissions. Second,
suggests that the integral
dy is non-negative, so in equilibrium a bank always reports β * (s) ≤ s. Finally, when a bank has the lowest possible borrowing cost, it reports its true borrowing cost β
, of bank i from manipulating LIBOR and the penalty, αψ
lower b i always leads to weakly higher profit and a lower penalty. When the marginal effect of b i on profit becomes larger than its marginal effect on the penalty at some s i , the monotonicity constraint binds and ∂β * (s i ) /∂s i = 0 for some s.
When the condition for strictly increasing equilibrium does not hold, the monotonicity of the best response function suggests that there exists s
Together with the fact that the probability density function of s i is unimodal, I can write a convex set θ ⊆ Θ in which the β * (s i ) =b for all s i ∈ θ. Figure   2 shows a sample equilibrium strategy with a bunching region θ. The equilibrium 
δ so the monotonicity constraint is binding when s i ∈ θ, the equilibrium strategy β * :
Θ → Θ for bank i with a realized borrowing cost s i / ∈ θ is the same as the case in Proposition 3
Intuitively, suppose that bank i with borrowing cost s i ∈ θ,θ is determining its optimal LIBOR submission, while all the other banks follow a strategy with a binding monotonic constraint as in Proposition 3. The "bunching" region creates a probability mass for the distribution of other banks' LIBOR submissions atb. The probability mass causes the probability of having bid b picked for calculating LIBOR to jump when b crosses theb from below, and leads to a jump in the marginal profit of LIBOR manipulation. Since any other bank j with s j ∈ θ,θ reportsb in equilibrium, the marginal profit atb − ε is lower than the marginal penalty, whereas the marginal profit atb + ε is higher than the marginal penalty. As a result, bank i's submission should also be between b − ε and b + ε, for arbitrarily small ε. In other words, when other banks' best responses have a "bunching" level, it is optimal for bank i to "join the bunch" given its cost s i ∈ θ,θ .
As Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 have shown, a bank's best responses under two cases are the same for s i / ∈ θ. This suggests a numerical search method to find the levelb. I start with
which is non-monotonic but continuous, as Figure 3 shows. I first notice thatb should be between two stationary points ofβ (s), i.e.,b ∈ b min ,b max . With this range, the equilibriumb maximizes
where θ andθ are the intersection ofb withβ (s). 
Extension with Signaling
Besides the income channel, banks also care about the signaling properties of their LIBOR submissions. When a bank releases a high interbank borrowing cost to the public, it signals its weak balance sheet. Such signals may invite costly bank runs, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) . Banks' repo counter-parties, who provides short term funding, may also close positions abruptly, leading to costly fire sales of long term assets (see Shleifer and Vishny (2011) ). This section extends the previous model with this signaling effect.
Suppose there are two unobservable states e ∈ {g, r}. Each bank is either in a good state e = g or in a "failing" or bank-run state e = r, and the bank's borrowing cost follow different distributions in each state. Each bank also has measure 1 of naive customers, such as demand depositors or repo trading counterparties, who are unaware of the bank's strategic LIBOR submission. With a prior belief that the bank is in a failing state with probability p, customers update their belief about the bank based on its LIBOR report b i . I note the posterior belief as π (b i ). Subsequently, a share of π (b i ) of customers decide not to roll over their position with the bank. This forces the bank to fire sale its long-term assets with a discount 1/ (1 + ρ) per unit.
I denote the probability density function of borrowing costs s i under the failing state as f r (x) = Pr (s i = x|e = r), and under the good state f g (x) = Pr (s i = x|e = g).
Bayes' rule suggests
A bank run usually leads to a much more severe loss than the expected penalty of LIBOR manipulation. Therefore, banks should limit their LIBOR submissions b to the level that
close to zero. This suggests a first order approximation for π (b i ) as
After π (b i ) share of the counterparties run, the bank needs to sell (1 + ρ) δA i π (b i ) of long term assets to meet the payment obligation δA i π (b i ), and therefore suffers a loss ρδA i π (b i ). The payoff for bank i with the effect of signaling is then
Similarly, I focus on the payoff function
by scaling the payoff by A i , and taking expectations with respect to its information set
As long as f r (x) stochastically dominate f g (x) in terms of likelihood ratio, the new payoff function satisfies the supermodularity in s i and b i
so that Proposition 2 still suggests the existence and monotonicity of the equilibrium.
In order to solve for the equilibrium strategy with signaling, I assume that each bank's borrowing cost follows an i.i.d. normal distribution N (µ g , σ 2 ) in the good state and N (µ r , σ 2 ) in the failing state. Clearly, f r (x) stochastically dominates f g (x) in terms of likelihood ratio and
where φ = exp
Proposition 5. With the signaling effect, if the probability density function of the distribution of the nth and N − nth order statistics satisfies the condition,
the strictly increasing equilibrium strategy β * : Θ → Θ for bank i with realized borrowing
where W is the Lambert-W function, 9 and
as in the previous section whileF
The proof is in the Appendix.
Remark. Given the distribution of borrowing costs, adding the signaling effect does not change the condition for the strictly increasing bidding strategy. Therefore, the ex ante distribution is normal with µ = 5% and σ = 1.5%, similar to the behavior of banks with high borrowing costs. The difference between β * (s i ) in these two cases shows that the signaling effect introduces a negative extra term
to a bank's LIBOR submission. Proposition 6. With the signaling effect, if the probability density function of the distribution of the nth and N − nth order statistics satisfies the condition,
δ so the monotonicity constraint is binding when s ∈ θ, the equilibrium strategy β * : Θ → Θ for a bank with realized borrowing cost s / ∈ θ is the same as the previous case
where W is Lambert-W function, and for
The proof is in Appendix. Note: Equilibrium strategy when the LIBOR panel contains N = 16 banks with i.i.d. normally distributed true borrowing cost and banks signal for credit quality. The mean borrowing cost is µ = 3% in good state, and µ = 13% in failing state. The standard deviation of borrowing costs is σ = 1.819%. The penalty ratio αψ/δ = 0.02. The implied bank run cost ρ/δ = 100. The left subplot shows the equilibrium strategy β * (s) as a function of borrowing cost s. The right subplot shows the distribution of borrowing costs and equilibrium submissions. The optimal strategy causes the submissions of banks to cluster around the lower half of the support. LIBOR panel banks may not always submit their true borrowing cost, so the rates are error prone. Although it might not be surprising that banks will submit low quotes given that they prefer a lower level of LIBOR, it is still necessary to decompose the LIBOR bias into different components, and study quantitatively how each component varies. The next section focuses on the economic implications of the model according to the comparative statics of banks' equilibrium submissions.
Economic implications 3.1 Signaling
Signaling causes a bank to report low borrowing costs to avoid a bank run. As a result, it creates an upper bound that is lower than the s max , for LIBOR reporting.
Corollary 7. The signaling creates an upper bound b max , which is lower than s max , for LIBOR. The upper bound is
This result suggests that the LIBOR fixing mechanism has an inherent limit in capturing the actual interbank borrowing costs: a bank never reports borrowing cost higher than the threshold b max . In other words, when the panel banks' borrowing costs become sufficiently high, the current LIBOR fixing mechanism will not generate meaningful results.
Besides creating an upper bound of LIBOR, the signaling also causes LIBOR to fluctuate not only with the borrowing cost s, but also with market sentiments. creditworthiness. In addition, since the reference rate is based on the trimmed average rather than a single bank's report, restricting access to each banks' report does not lead to the disruption of market function. Therefore, after simply withholding certain information from the market participants, the panel bank's signaling attempt can be blocked. Nevertheless, LIBOR bias also depends on banks' fundamentals, as the next section discusses.
Bank's fundamentals
How does LIBOR bias vary with panel banks' fundamentals? I evaluate two aspects of banks' fundamentals. The first is the degree of maturity mismatch on banks' balance sheets, and the second is the dispersion of borrowing costs among banks. Interestingly, LIBOR bias only exists when both aspects exist.
Corollary 9. When the LIBOR panel banks' degree of maturity mismatch goes up, the equilibrium submissions of banks move away from the truth due to both the income and the signaling channel.
The higher the maturity mismatch of panel banks' balance sheets, the more those banks rely on short term funding. As an important reference rate with less than one year maturity, a lower LIBOR rate reduces short-term funding costs. Therefore, a higher degree of maturity mismatch gives banks more incentive to manipulate LIBOR.
Besides the magnitude of maturity mismatch, the dispersion of borrowing costs across panel banks is also a key determinant of LIBOR bias.
Corollary 10. The income and signaling effect of LIBOR manipulation also depends on the dispersion of borrowing cost S. When S becomes more dispersed, each bank's equilibrium submission moves from its true borrowing cost. Figure 7 shows the effect of both aspects. It is tempting to believe that as long as panel banks benefit from lower LIBOR, they report lower borrowing costs. However, the equilibrium suggests that the income channel becomes significant only when there is dispersion in banks' borrowing costs. In other words, when banks' borrowing costs become very close, the equilibrium strategy is to report the cost almost truthfully, even though banks have a large incentive to manipulate LIBOR. Therefore, the fact that banks prefer a lower rate does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the number generated by the LIBOR fixing mechanism is wrong. This also explains why LIBOR was a reasonably reliable measure before the financial crisis, when the banks were not highly leveraged.
In addition, as a crucial benchmark of the overall health of the financial system, LIBOR rates get more attention during a financial crisis than during normal times.
Unfortunately, since the dispersion of banks' borrowing costs is higher during the financial crisis, the current LIBOR fixing process causes a more biased LIBOR during the turmoil, exactly when a solid benchmark is needed the most. Clearly, in order to minimize the size of LIBOR bias, proper regulation is indispensable.
Regulation and policy implications
Next, I evaluate how regulation shapes banks' submission strategies. Intuitively, when banks can report untruthfully without any consequence, they will push the LIBOR to the lowest level. Therefore, banks' LIBOR submissions contain no information about their interbank borrowing cost. This will not happen when there is a penalty, which could either be an explicit audit to check whether a bank reports its borrowing cost truthfully or the threat of an audit. The following proposition confirms the intuition.
Corollary 11. If regulators do not monitor the LIBOR fixing, then strategically behaved banks will report the lowest possible borrowing cost. If there is a penalty for misreporting, then strategically behaved banks will not report the lowest possible borrowing cost as long as their borrowing cost is higher than the riskless rate. This is true even with arbitrarily small positive αψ.
Since the LIBOR manipulation scandal broke, regulators have started to discuss possible options for strengthening the LIBOR mechanism, as documented in Wheatley (2012). One option is to increase participation in LIBOR panels. An alternative way is to calculate by taking the average of a random submission from the central quartiles.
The next two corollaries analyze each option.
Corollary 12. When the number of banks in the pool increases, the income effect of LIBOR manipulation fades away and causes each bank's equilibrium submission to converge to its true borrowing cost from below. However, the signaling channel cannot be removed by adding more banks.
Adding more banks into the LIBOR panel helps to reduce the size of LIBOR bias.
The effect of penalty coefficient αψ and the number of panel banks to LIBOR bias are illustrated in the Figure 8 . Suppose that each bank in the central quartile has a probability q of getting selected. This reduces each bank's probability of changing LIBOR by a factor of q. On the other hand, if bank i does get selected in the averaging, its submission now has 1/q times more weight. Therefore, the conditional expectation of the bank's payoff 
Mechanism design
The previous section shows that the LIBOR rate is not what it is supposed to bea trimmed arithmetic average of banks' true borrowing costs -when strategic panel banks with different borrowing costs can benefit from manipulating LIBOR. This motivates a LIBOR fixing mechanism in which banks truthfully report. I note the direct mechanism, in which the banks report true borrowing cost, as (L * , M * ), in which L * : Θ → R + defines how to calculate the LIBOR, and M * i : Θ N → R is the payment rule which sets the amount every bank i pays BBA to join the LIBOR panel. I define the mechanism as efficient if it generates a LIBOR equal to
The existence of the payment rule motivates a direct LIBOR fixing mechanism (L * , M * ) to be ex ante individually rational and ex ante budget balanced, as defined below.
Definition. The LIBOR fixing mechanism (L * , M * ) is ex ante individually rational, if given z = {z 1 , ..., z N } as banks' equilibrium reports under the mechanism (L * , M * ), the unconditional expectation of the sum of the banks' payoffs and payments to the BBA over the realization of a borrowing cost s i is zero for all i:
Definition. A direct LIBOR fixing mechanism is ex ante budget balanced if the sum of banks' expected payments to the BBA is zero.
An ex ante individual rationality defined above is different from traditional individual rationality conditions. The traditional individual rationality condition requires a bank to receive higher value Π i (s, z) from LIBOR manipulation than M * i (z), the amount it has to remit to the regulator, under any realization of borrowing costs s.
Therefore, the ex ante individual rationality is a weaker condition than traditional individual rationality. However, this does not imply that an ex ante individually rational mechanism is not feasible. When the mechanism satisfies the ex ante individual rationality, a bank's expected payoff from participating in the LIBOR fixing is zero.
Therefore, the regulator can sign a contract with the panel banks to have them commit to participate in LIBOR fixing mechanism (L * , M * ) at the beginning of an extended period.
Similarly, an ex ante budget-balanced LIBOR fixing mechanism means that the expected transfer to the regulator is zero, even if the total transfer to the regulator is not zero in each day. The following section shows the existence of an efficient, ex ante individually rational and ex ante budget-balanced mechanism.
AGV mechanism
The signaling channel encourages LIBOR panel banks to misrepresent their borrowing costs to signal a strong balance sheet. This channel can be muted by publishing the banks' submissions only to the regulator, not to the general public. By turning off the signaling channel, a bank's equilibrium reporting strategy becomes the case in Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.
The income channel can also be turned off under the direct, efficient, ex ante budgetbalanced and individually rational LIBOR fixing mechanism, along the line of the AGV mechanism by d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) .
Proposition 14. There is a direct, efficient, ex ante budget balanced, and individually rational LIBOR fixing mechanism (L * , M * ) in which banks report z = {z 1 , ..., z N },
and every bank i pays the BBA
.
Despite the long formulae of
measures how much bank i can obtain through LIBOR manipulation. This is exactly the intuition behind the revelation principle. Part (2) is the average of the BBA's transfer to the rest of the panel: it ensures the ex ante budget balance of the BBA.
The detailed proof is in the Appendix.
Conclusion
Since its inception in 1986, LIBOR has become a widely referenced pivotal benchmark This article also gives suggestions on the mechanism design of the LIBOR fixing process. Increasing the number of banks in the panel will send the LIBOR rate closer to the correct level. Most importantly, there exists a direct and ex-ante budget-balanced mechanism under which each bank reports its true borrowing costs.
A Appendix
This section contains the proof for the Propositions and Lemmas. To simplify notation,
A.1 Proofs
I first prove the existence of pure strategy symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, using the results from Athey (2001) , then show the monotonicity of equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The single crossing property holds thanks to the supermodularity condition. In 
Together with the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in nondecreasing strategies in any finite type space Θ ′ , Theorem 2 of Athey (2001) suggests the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in nondecreasing strategies in continuum type space Θ.
Using monotone selection theorem in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , an alternative for Topkis' theorem when supermodularity, aka, the strictly increasing difference (SID) holds. The function satisfies SID since given s i < s
Before I proceed to Proposition 3, I need the following Lemma. 
is once and twice differentiable in b i , since
With the Lemma A.1, I now prove Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. 
Therefore, for bank i with borrowing cost as r f + s i , and submitting b i , replace the
therefore the condition for strictly increasing β (s i ) is max x∈Θ f
, and by the property of order statistics,
the best response is weakly lower than the actual borrowing cost, and β (0) = 0 regardless of the distribution of borrowing costs s.
Plug in the order statistics, I have
Let us now look at the case in which the monotonicity constraint is binding. Again, I prove a Lemma about the twice differentiability first.
Proof. In this case, cumulative distribution function G (x) is RCLL, and is continuous everywhere except atb. In this case, cumulative distribution function
also RCLL, and is continuous everywhere except atb. Definê
δ, the probability density function is
In this case, I can write E [L (b i , b −i )] similarly as 6, and I know it is twice differentiable when b i =b.
While for b i =b + ε, and ε ↓ 0, I have
is RCLL.
Before working on the equilibrium strategy under monotonicity constraint, let's look at the relationship between the jth order statistic cumulative distribution function of borrowing cost F (N −1) j (·), and that of banks' submissions G
the Hamiltonian is
+λ (s i ) , µ (s i ) and Pontryagin's principle suggests an optimum β * (s i ) and µ * (s i ) satisfies
and in the region that derivative exists,
From complementary slackness, when constraint is not binding, I have λ (s i ) = 0, so ∂λ (s i ) /∂s i = 0. Therefore, for s / ∈ θ, the FOC is the same as before:
N −n (β * (s i )) . for all s i . Therefore the same condition for the strictly increasing equilibrium applies to the signaling case.
Proof of Propositions 6
Proof. The Proof of Proposition 4 also works in the signaling case as long as I replace the payoff function of banks.
Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. Suppose banks adopt symmetric strategy. When there is no penalty, αψ = 0,
so for any β (s i ) > 0, there is always anotherβ (s i ) = β (s i ) − ε < β (s i ) that Pareto dominates β (s i ). In other words, banks will report the lowest possible borrowing costs, aka b = β (s i ) = 0, and the LIBOR rate will converge to the riskless rate.
In case αψ > 0, assume β (s i ) = 0 for some s i > 0, then
= αψs i > 0 so submittingβ (s i ) = ε > 0 Pareto dominates submitting β (s i ) = 0. Hence banks' submissions will be higher than the riskless rate.
Finally I prove Proposition 14.
In addition,
suggests (L * , M * ) is ex ante budget balanced.
About individual rationality: since the mechanism is direct, so z * i = s i , the ex ante payoff of bank under the mechanism (L * , M * ) is 
Notice the expectation is over the distribution of s = {s 1 , ..., s N }, so I have
therefore the mechanism is ex ante individually rational.
